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Beyond Bergson: the ontology of togetherness
     Bergson does not have a theory of communication per se but his views on communication can be 
extracted from his ontology and epistemology. These views may account for some apparent failures 
of communication – conflicts, loneliness, hostility – and suggest a way out towards better and more 
harmonious intersubjective relations.     
     Bergson claims that we misunderstand reality in general and each other in particular. Instead of 
trying to grasp human nature directly in intuition we analyse its being and create a distorted view of 
one another. If we were able to conceive human self as it is, we would see it as duration and may be 
able to reach the state of an open society where people’s love towards one another is ontologically 
backed by their epistemological openness towards each other’s being.  
     However, the Bergsonian theory of duration and intuition, promising to resolve the difficulties of 
communication, reasserts these difficulties metaphysically.  The idea of duration entails the 
impossibility of accessing it from outside, as the genuine view of it is only possible from within. This 
paper, instead of trying to salvage a model of communication where people strive to intuit each 
other’s uniqueness, locates intuition in the very act of communication. Bergson himself finds 
intuition in artistic creation where the artist and spectators communicate by intuiting a common 
object without learning any personal details about each other.  We find that communication is itself 
duration and that the communicating participants are heterogeneous elements of that duration. As 
such they are subservient to the act of communication that displays features of autonomous existence. 
Our model of communication, albeit accepting the impenetrability of one’s person for a complete 
intelligent penetration from outside, allows for the partial fusion of minds engaged in the same act of 
communication and negotiating the same subject matter.  
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The solitude of selfhood: demonstration of analysis and intuition
     Bergson distinguishes two ways in which we can be acquainted with the world and people in it: 
we can either immerse ourselves in their being, sympathising with them and grasping their true nature 
or we can observe them from outside, analyse what we perceive and reconstruct the whole object 
using the fragmented information collected along the way. The view from inside, which Bergson 
calls intuition, is able to give us an instant and simple vision of infinitely complex reality. 
Regretfully, we most often exercise the other approach and, remaining outside things and beings, 
distort reality and modify it according to our practical requirements. According to Bergson, reality is 
dynamic, diverse and abundant, but we divide it up mentally into stable and static fragments that our 
mind is capable of grasping and, when these fragments are rearranged again to make a compete 
picture, we end up with a one-sided, simplified and hence false representation of reality. When we 
communicate, we do not address people as they are but as they appear through the prism of our 
rational analytical interpretation. The real person is out of our reach, so no wonder our 
communications entail misunderstandings and conflicts. If instead we could master and practice 
intuition, we would gain an insight into another person’s being, an insight that would bring along 
mutual understanding and mutual sympathy. 
     In order to demonstrate the difference between intuition that is faithful to the fulsome and vibrant 
flow of reality and analysis that alters and simplifies it, I will compare two literary texts that could be 
said to exemplify these methods.  In one of them events are presented in an obviously fallacious 
manner, exaggerating the work of analysis.  The other endeavours to offer a matter-of-fact, realistic and 
detailed account of the events as they may have happened for real, thus exemplifying the tendency to 
intuit.
     The texts in question, Three Musketeers by Alexander Dumas and The Chronicle of the Reign of 
Charles IX by Prosper Mérimée, have similar storylines. In both narratives young men (d’Artagnan and 
George Mergy respectively), albeit separated by some two hundred years of the history of Europe, are 
involved in adventures that revolve around France and the French court.  The authors often put their 
heroes’ lives in danger, but whereas reading about d’Artagnan we may feel thrilled and excited, 
Mergy’s predicaments are more likely to make us feel troubled and uneasy, as predicaments actually 
do.  In the swift and exhilarating narrative of Three Musketeers we read:    
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[T]he gentleman drew his sword and swooped upon d’Artagnan; but he had a strong 
opponent to contend with. 
In three seconds, d’Artagnan had given him three strokes of the sword, saying at each 
stroke:
"One for Athos, one for Porthos, one for Aramis!"
At the third stroke, the gentleman fell in a heap.
D’Artagnan thought he was dead, or at least unconscious, and went up to him to take the 
order; but just as he reached out to search him, the wounded man, who had not let go of his 
sword, thrust the point into his chest, saying: 
"And one for you!"
"And one for me! Saving the best for last!" d’Artagnan cried, furious, and pinned him to the 
ground with a fourth stroke through the stomach.
This time the gentleman closed his eyes and passed out. 
D’Artagnan rummaged in the pocket where he had seen him put the order of passage, and 
took it. It was in the name of comte de Wardes.
Then, casting a glance on the handsome young man, who was barely twenty-five years old, 
and whom he left lying there, insensible and perhaps dead, he heaved a sigh over the strange 
destiny that leads men to destroy each other for the interests of people who are strangers to 
them and who often do not even know that they exist.1
     The above extract portrays an incident of an attempted murder in such a light-hearted manner as if it 
were a demonstration of dexterity and fencing skills, an impromptu dance. The ghastly content of the 
story is masked so well by the cheerfulness of the narrative that danger appears thrilling and not really 
dangerous, wounds do not hurt and it does not hurt to wound.  But this interpretation of fighting and 
injuring someone is clearly incorrect, as a normal, attractive person that d’Artagnan is supposed to be 
would not injure someone cheerfully and light-heartedly. Dumas obviously tampers with the idea of a 
swordfight in order to produce an image of it that amuses and entertains.  In the Bergsonian terms, he 
breaks this idea down to its minute elements and reconstructs it to serve the needs of his narration, 
inevitably straying from the truth. 
      The description of a swordfight in The Chronicle of the Reign of Charles IX is more thorough, more 
distressing and more credible. 
1 Alexandre Dumas, The Three Musketeers, Translated by Richard Pevear, Penguin Books, 2006, pp. 
216 – 217.
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Before Comminges could draw back his sward, Mergy struck him with his dagger on the head 
so violently that he himself lost his balance and fell to the ground. Comminges dropped at the 
same time, so that the seconds thought them both dead. 
Mergy was soon on his feet, and his first motion was to pick up his sward which he had let 
slip in his fall. Comminges did not stir. Béville lifted him up, and wiping with a handkerchief 
his face, which was drenched in blood, saw that the dagger had entered the eye, and that his 
friend had been killed on the spot, the steel having beyond all doubt pierced the brain.2      
     Whereas d’Artagnan, leaving comte de Wardes to bleed, merely “heave[s] a sigh” and dashes off to 
continue his audacious expedition, Mergy “stare[s] at the corpse with haggard eyes.”3  He “shiver[s] all 
over, and great tears beg[i]n to trickle down his cheeks”4, which is a more plausible reaction to having 
killed a person than d’Artagnan’s “heaving a sigh”.  
     Despite defeating their adversaries, both men are themselves slightly wounded.  When 
d’Artagnan’s servant reminds his master of the wound, d’Artagnan says: "It’s nothing. Let’s deal 
with what’s most urgent; then we can come back to my wound, which anyhow doesn’t seem very 
dangerous to me.”5 After that they ride off “with great strides.”6  Mergy, on the other hand, spends a 
few days convalescing and reflecting on his horrible experience, and Mérimée initiates us into his 
state of mind. 
When you have killed a man, and when this man is the first you have killed, you are haunted 
for some time, and especially at nightfall, by the memory and the look of the last struggle 
that ushered in his death. The mind is so full of gloomy thoughts, that it is hard to take part 
even in the most trivial conversation; all talk wearies and annoys; while, on the other hand, 
solitude is dreaded because it strengthens the oppression of fancy. Despite the frequent visits 
of Béville and the captain, Mergy spent the days immediately succeeding his duel in the 
deepest sadness. A sharp touch of fever, brought on by his wound, kept him sleepless at 
night, and this was his worst time.7   
     Whilst reading Dumas’ hilarious tale, we tend to skim the surface of the events. Reading 
Mérimée, we tend to become immersed in what is happening sharing the character’s moods and 
2 Prosper Mérimée, A Chronicle of the Reign of Charles, translated by Frank S. Holby, New York and 
Philadelphia, MCMVI, pp. 144 – 145.
3 Mérimée, p. 145.
4 Mérimée, p. 146.
5 Dumas, p. 217.
6 Dumas, p. 217.
7 Mérimée, p. 151 – 152.
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feelings as they may have taken place.  Neither narrative is a perfect example of either simplification 
of reality or intuitive grasp, but each indicates a tendency towards one of the epistemological 
standpoints proposed by Bergson.  Of course, Mérimée’s story is also written with a certain purpose, 
and imaginary reality is selected and manipulated to produce a certain effect on the reader, but the 
author aims at giving a realistic account of Mergy’s experiences and tries to initiate the reader into 
the mind of a duellist and let him or her learn how one really may feel after a successful contest.  
Whereas Dumas analyses, simplifies and distorts facts, Mérimée tries to follow them accurately in 
their complexity and originality, to intuit them. 
     Dumas’ attention-grabbing narrative, where a series of crimes is skilfully presented as a string of 
breathtaking and enviable experiences, shows to what extent we can manipulate reality in our minds 
which, according to Bergson, happens in our interactions with reality all the time. Whilst perceiving 
something or someone, we present them to ourselves in the way that it fits with our wants, 
simplifying their nature, creating a one-sided picture of them and constructing an image exceedingly 
removed from the truth. 
     Are the problems in our communications due to the fact that we treat each other like Dumas treats 
d’Artagnan and comte de Wardes, without making an effort to understand what it is like to be 
someone else? Would the situation improve if we attempted to get into the heart of psychological 
events like Mérimée does?  The Bergsonian answer would be yes, intuiting each other would bring 
harmony and happiness into society, and this paper tests the validity of this claim.
The solitude of selfhood: from intelligence and instinct to intuition 
     According to Bersgon, instinct and intelligence are not successive degrees of one and the same 
tendency but two qualitatively different epistemological tendencies that are linked to the practical 
needs of their agents. Animals need their instinct to direct them towards sources of food, and rationality 
is used to modify environment to suit the needs of human beings.
     Intelligence looks at matter – and consequently at everything else – with the view of modifying it 
whilst building tools and thus regards it as a substance capable of adopting any form. There is a limit to 
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what extent real matter can be decomposed and reassembled, but the mind disregards the matter’s real 
limitations and treats it as decomposable in principle. Thus “the intellect is characterized by the 
unlimited power of decomposing according to any law and of recomposing into any system.” (CE, 165)
     We have seen in Dumas’ example the unlimited agility of intellectual analysis where a horrific 
event is reworked to produce a hilarious tale. If necessary, the same event could be made into a funny, 
spooky or moving story, depending on the author’s aim and regardless of the boundaries of the event 
itself. All this is possible because on the metaphysical level, “[t]he intellect represents becoming as a 
series of states, each of which is homogeneous with itself and consequently does not change.” (CE, 
171) If we attempt to reveal the internal change occurring within one of those states, we break it up into 
another series of states, and so on, so becoming and reality per se escape our understanding.
     Instinct on the other hand can comprehend creation. It is moulded on the very form of dynamic life 
and, while intellect employs a mechanical approach to everything, instinct proceeds organically. The 
work of nature that creates organisms is, according to Bergson, continued in instinct, which is a natural 
ability to use an inborn mechanism. Instinct is a prolongation of the work of life and, if it were 
conscious, “it would give up to us the most intimate secrets of life.” (CE, p. 174) Unfortunately, what is 
instinctive cannot be expressed in terms of intelligence, because instinctive activity is unconscious. 
Bergson concludes: “There are things that intelligence alone is able to seek, but which, by itself, it will 
never find. These things instinct alone can find; but it will never seek them.” (CE, p. 159)
     Intuition appears on the scene as the epistemological faculty that transcends both intelligence and 
instinct and compensates for their deficiencies. Intuition is described as “instinct that has become 
disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely.” (CE, 
p. 186) An epistemological triumph over the rusty ways of our imperfect rational reasoning, the 
intuitive insight initiates our mind into the essence of the object, which makes intuitive knowledge 
independent from a subjective point of view. Whereas in analysis we remain outside the object and 
move round it, in intuition we use our imagination to immerse into the object. In analysis we break the 
object down to familiar elements and then attempt to reconstruct the original, but in intuition we 
coincide with the object as a whole. Thus intuition is a simple act, whilst the stages of analysis can go 
on indefinitely. Intuitive knowledge reflects the real, dynamic thing, superseding conceptual 
knowledge, which crystallizes the moving object into artificially constructed but practically 
manageable schemas and symbols.     
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     Bergson demonstrates the possibility of evoking intuition in the perception of motion.  When we lift 
the arm, our mind, in its intelectual mode, does not imagine beforehand nor perceives “all the 
elementary contractions and tensions this act involves” but “is carried immediately to the end … to the 
schematic and simplified version of the act supposed accomplished.” (CE, pp. 315 – 316) The 
movement of the arm takes place by itself without the accompaniment of the conscious attention and 
fills the gaps between the imagined points of rest. To evoke an intuitive perception of this movement 
our consciousness must detach itself from the anticipated image of the completed act and concentrate 
on the movement that is going on at the time of perception. One must become aware of the immediacy 
and resist the temptation to reflect on the past phases and anticipate the following ones.  As the 
movement unrolls, our conscious awareness must flow with it, coinciding with its unfolding. This 
would give us an immediate and uncontaminated insight into reality, disclosing to our mind duration as 
an indivisible fusion of successive moments.  Unlike conceptual recognition, intuitive perception itself 
is a simple and indivisible act, the duplicate of duration, which it mirrors in an act of conscious 
awareness.  
     The exercise described above is within the range of human abilities and shows that intuition is 
attainable in principle. But if we can intuit the movement of one’s own arm, does it follow that we can 
intuit conscious processes and thus enhance communication with fellow humans? 
Intuiting psychological duration 
     Our misconception of concrete people and events stems from the deep-seated tendency to treat 
fleeting reality, including consciousness, as static things. If we could effortlessly intuit human 
consciousness, we would see it for what it is: a multiplicity of states that permeate one another and do 
not exist in separation.  For example, we would not separate our being sad an hour ago and being happy 
now but we would recognise that our earlier state of mind contributes something to our later state of 
mind: perhaps an event that has made us smile now would not have made us smile had we not been sad 
previously.  
     An inner multiplicity, generated within consciousness, is distinct from extensive, measurable 
magnitudes found outside consciousness. An externally, spatially posited multiplicity contains 
countable units, whereas the inner multiplicity is a qualitative diversity and cannot be considered in 
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numerical terms. Enumeration implies countable items, identical in nature but distinct from one another 
in their spatial position; otherwise they would merge into a single unit. Counting, Bergson argues, 
involves juxtaposition of units, setting them alongside one another – the procedure only being possible 
in space and not in time. Consciousness, on the other hand, belongs to the domain of time, “pure 
duration”: this is the realm of the unextended and the intense. True time, consciousness, duration is 
“nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without 
precise outlines, without any tendency to externalise themselves in relation to one another, without any 
affiliation with number: it [is] pure heterogeneity.” (TFW, p.104) 
     Bergson asserts the dynamic self, which does not endure through time preserving some stable core 
of its identity – it is time in the way that it captures inner processes as they are and incorporates them 
into itself. Psychological duration is not a succession of clearly defined and mutually external units but 
is a heterogeneous continuity of qualitatively diverse successive phases ontologically bound with one 
another. There is no distinction between the duration itself and its content, and processes that constitute 
duration constitute embodied time in their ceaseless emergence.     
     We can intuit our own conscious processes if we stop thinking of our own self as made up of 
separate perceptions, memories and feelings and accept that our self is a continuous flux of 
interconnected processes, recognizing that “[t]here is a succession of states, each of which announces 
that which follows and contains that which precedes it” and that “[n]o one of them begins or ends, but 
all extend into each other.” (Introduction, p. 25) 
     We must let our consciousness fix its attention on the immediate phase of our psychological life 
without trying to name our current state, without reflecting on the past, however immediate, and 
without anticipating the future, however proximate. Our conscious awareness would then temporally 
coincide with the actual being of our psyche and follow emotions and sensations as they unfold. For 
Bergson, this is the only way we could grasp duration, which “can be presented to us directly in an 
intuition” and “can never … be enclosed in a conceptual representation.” (Introduction, p. 30) 
     Bergson asserts that primarily we do grasp our own conscious sates as they occur – permeating one 
another, melting into one another and forming an organic whole. Our feelings, perceptions, sensations 
emerge as ever changing and fluidic and only the necessity to rationalise and verbalise our conscious 
life brings about the edited, distorted picture of selfhood.  We acknowledge our states of mind at the 
same time as they occur, but our thought does not remain dissolved in the emotional and sensual flux. 
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Our orienteering in the world requires attention to the objects of thought, and if the object of thought is 
our own feelings, we need to pay attention to them.  An attentive act takes some time, so if we focus on 
our inner psychological event that is happening at time t, our thought of it does not expire when the 
time t passes. We continue pondering on the event that happened at time t during time t’, and our 
attentive act has inevitable side effects. Firstly, we miss events that happened after time t and which are 
happening at time t’. Secondly, our representation of time t and of the events that happened at time t is 
distorted because we no longer perceive these events in their fluidity. Rational attention, it seems, 
necessarily involves this misshapen perception of the world and people in it.  
     The primary experiencing of the self in its fundamental and most true form occurs in dreams, or in 
inattentive perception of sounds – in other words, at a pre-reflective stage, when the self lets itself 
relax. Then the self is detached from the external world and can just be itself without co-ordinating its 
fleeting elements with external markers. But as soon as we “wake up”, we align the events of our inner 
life with the external phenomena, breaking duration into segments.  It is extremely difficult to 
counteract the habitual way of dealing with our own self, but if successful, one is rewarded with the 
manifestation of one’s own uniqueness and exclusivity. One gains a view of oneself where he or she is 
not measured or judged against any superimposed criteria and where one’s value as an inimitable 
individual is not betrayed by standardisation.  
     The opposition of two epistemological faculties, intuition and analysis, involves two alternative 
ways in which human beings treat one another. We can either analyse, spatialise and simplify or intuit 
and understand.  Although we spatialise each other under ordinary circumstances, one get a feeling that 
at least Bergson indicates an ideal philosophical model of communication.  This ideal implies intuiting 
one’s own and another person’s selves in their purity, as durations and neutralizing antagonisms, which 
are due to the ignorance and estrangement between people. 
    But, as demonstrated in TFW, mind as duration can only be adequately accessed from within, by 
itself, and this makes one mind inaccessible for other minds.  Bergson’s example of Paul and Peter 
confirms the impossibility of grasping another person’s true nature. (TFW, pp. 184 - 189) Paul, wishing 
to grasp Peter’s state of mind, may learn all the facts about Peter’s life and form an idea of his 
character.  But this knowledge will necessarily be incomplete because when Peter passes through a 
certain psychic state, only he knows fully the intensity and the importance of this psychic state whereas 
Paul would reconstruct it by measurement or comparison. “[T]he intensity of … a deep-seated feeling 
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is nothing else than the feeling itself” (TFW, p. 185) and no amount of reconstructed information can 
replace the actual experiencing of that feeling firsthand. One can never be skilful enough to explain the 
importance of one’s feelings to another person either, because the experienced state of mind is given to 
us directly “as an inexpressible quality” (TFW, p. 186) and our explanations will necessarily draw on 
argumentation and comparison. Our attempts to understand another mind by replacing real conscious 
experiences with symbols and images could only give us an accumulation of imperfect data, so the only 
way Paul could get to know Peter for real is by living Paul’s life and feeling his feelings like an actor. 
The impersonation would have to be complete to minute details because “the most common-place 
events have their importance in a life-story”. (TFW, p. 187)  But if Peter and Paul had the same 
experiences at the same time and in the same place, they could not be two separate people.  They would 
be one and the same person who is Peter when he acts and Paul when he reiterates his history.  
     Our need for communication makes us spatialise duration. Bringing our conscious states outwards, 
we separate them from one another and express them in words, which is a precondition for 
communication.  As Bergson admits, “[T]he intuition of a homogeneous space is … a step towards 
social life” (TFW, p.138) and the clarity that the process of spatialization and externalisation of the self 
entails is essential for communication, whereas the truly genuine existence of selfhood is possible only 
in isolation from other selves.
      Bergson concludes that the regular perception of one’s own conscious life as duration would be 
only possible in a hypothetical individual who, immersed in his or her own being, would live a socially 
isolated life, where society and language would not force him or her to interpret his or her conscious 
flow as a series of individualised phenomena. (TFW, pp. 137 – 138) In its fundamental form the self is 
locked within itself and is incommunicable since any attempt to externalise psychic events involves 
their juxtaposition and spatialization. 
     Bergson’s theory of duration and intuition leaves us with a disappointing result. After reading TFW, 
MM or CE one becomes convinced that the term duration illuminates some aspects of reality, which 
could otherwise be left unnoticed.  Duration accounts for the continuity of temporal reality, 
heterogeneity highlights its complexity and its unity, and intuition is a process in which duration and 
heterogeneity are recognized as such.  In the sphere of intersubjective relations intuition promises a 
deep mutual understanding that would remove the usual antagonisms based on the ignorance and 
rejection of other people’s concerns and aspirations.  But intuiting someone else in the Bergsonian 
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sense would involve a complete identification with that person. One can only intuit one’s own soul, but 
even that is not easy. Communication is based on conceptualisation and if the intuitive grasp of another 
mind were possible, it would involve a collapse of two individuals into one.  Bergson’s theory at this 
stage leaves us in a no win situation: people could have perfect relationships if they communicated as 
true selves, but in order to communicate at all, they must falsify their own and other people’s nature.      
Bergson’s theory of duration and intuition, instead of offering a model of perfect communication 
contradicts the very idea of communication as a valid social phenomenon. If we were hoping to receive 
guidance for finding happiness through the better understanding of each other, then what good is this 
ontologically illuminating but existentially pessimistic theory to us?     
     If in communication we seek mutual appreciation and the complete understanding of each other’s 
nature then Bergson’s theory of duration and intuition leads us to a dead end indeed.  The ultimate 
harmony of intersubjective relations would require an absolute immersion into another person’s mind, 
but if it were possible, it would be done at the expense of the privacy of our inner life, defying the 
sovereignty of our subjectivity and our psychological autonomy. But does this mean that intuition is 
not achievable in communication at all? Is loneliness the price that we must pay for our subjectivity 
and our psychological autonomy? It seems so if we understand communication in a narrow sense as a 
dialogue, where the parties stand face-to-face with one another and talk about each other, excluding 
from this discourse their wider interactions with the world. But if communication is not only an intense 
exchange of questions and answers about ourselves, then mutual understanding and intuition could be 
sought in joint action, in shared experiences, in creating and perceiving art, in teamwork, in belonging 
to a group, and other types of implicit, un-verbalised communication.     
     Bergson himself examines art as a form of communication where the artist communicates with the 
spectators via his or her intuitive creation, although this does not involve an exchange of personal data 
between the artist and the audience.  (TFW, p 186)  For Bergson, artistic creation is that ontological 
niche where human beings actualise their ability to intuit.  Art connects the artist and the viewer, as 
both intuit the work of art, which is something other than their own personal history, something that 
belongs to both of them and at the same time exists independently from them.  The same work of art 
may evoke different response in different viewers and it may be contrary to the artist’s own disposition, 
but ontologically it will belong to the same unity as the artist’s emotions, and will involve intuiting the 
same duration as the artist and other viewers.  Thus the artist’s personal input and the viewer’s 
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response are elements of one heterogeneity and as such are interconnected.  By intuiting that unity, the 
viewer may feel the echo of the artist’s presence, and the contemplation of the work of art may bring 
deep personal satisfaction through the artist’s power of communication. The satisfaction may not 
necessarily be jovial. Art can move and disturb, but it gives us the feeling of mutual understanding that 
is distinct from the understanding of articulated concepts. In this intuitive understanding one accesses a 
psychological field other than existing within one’s own mind but which echoes one’s own mind.  In 
art we intuit reality that others intuit too and this can give us a sense of belonging, comfort and 
inspiration, even though the belonging may be totally anonymous, as when listening to a piece of music 
by an unknown composer. 
     But what has been said about art can be said about any other act of communication. In art we have a 
materialised, definite manifestation of one person’s being powerfully presented and making an 
impression on other people. Art is in its ideal form a disinterested activity, but any other 
communication also creates a field of shared experience not entirely reducible to a streamlined 
exchange of functional information.  Every practical interaction is surrounded by a halo of personal 
touch where people appear unique and irreplaceable, even when they are treated as merely performing 
a certain function.              
     All Bergsonian characteristics of duration are applicable to instances of communication, we must 
conclude. Communication is an internally coherent process that has history and prehistory; it evolves 
and engages its participants in a flow of its own existence. We can treat communication as 
heterogeneous duration in its own right and the people’s contributions to it as the elements of this 
heterogeneity. Then we can talk more positively of effective and satisfactory communication, as we 
realise that the boundaries of people’s minds open up to one another if they are involved in the same 
process of communication.
Communication as heterogeneous duration
     Communication underpins every instance of a joint purposeful action, and messaging is so 
intertwined with action that it would require a special investigation to establish at what point 
communication ends and action begins.  This enquiry is not concerned with the relation of 
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communication and action, but with the relations between communicating individuals, so we can 
overlook the difference between communication and action and let the two terms overlap. 
     Understanding communication in a wider sense than merely a verbal exchange that precedes some 
action, we could say that communication includes situations where individuals acknowledge a message 
and react to it. There may be a wide range of reactions, not excluding silence and inaction, for instance 
when students listen to a lecture. In this case the apparent inactivity of the contributors to the act of 
communication entails latent response and is a necessary component of that kind of communication. 
Indeed, the lecture as an act of communication requires a silent listening audience as well as the 
speaking lecturer, because if the lecturer is speaking in an empty room, it is not communication.
     In the act of communication the interacting parties, whilst releasing and receiving information do 
not need to acknowledge each other.  When reading a message we do not need to know who exactly 
wrote it.  If we see a sign “Keep out” and do keep out, then the successful act of communication has 
taken place and the personality of the author is of little importance.  Travellers passing through an 
uninhabited land would be excited to find any man-made objects – remains of a tent, or empty tins – 
with an immediate feeling of having some communication with human beings who made and used 
those objects, although their names may never be known.  Bergson himself talks of Robinson Crusoe 
providing an example where messages do not contain information about their authors and yet 
communication takes place.  Robinson “remains in contact with other men” by means of “the 
manufactured objects he saved from the wreck”. (TSMR, p. 16) These communications contain 
implicit messages of society encrypted in manmade objects conveying their manmade purpose and 
their manmade history. The manufacturers’ role here amounts to being the carriers of that information.  
Their personalities are ontologically secondary and subservient to this flow of information, just as the 
elements of heterogeneity are subservient to the whole.  What seems to be essential to communication 
is the meaningful fusion of the message and the response to it.  The personalities of the individuals 
involved are secondary to this flow of content, as the participants can be left out of focus and yet the 
communication would still flow.  What remains is the flow of content that relies on the conscious 
participants as conductors of information and as agencies that make ideas materialise.  
     Communication is generated by the joint conscious effort of its participants and in this sense it as a 
conscious process despite the fact that normally we think of a conscious process as the work of one 
mind. (Bergson teaches us to be flexible with our definitions and descriptions, convinced that it is 
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better to violate and rework concepts, adapting words subtly to reality, than to ignore the intricacy of 
reality and squeeze it into an established conceptual framework. Bergson himself talks of degrees of 
consciousness in a different context8 but this approach justifies us attempting to explain the ambiguous 
reality of communication as conscious reality, although it is not conscious in the usual sense as 
belonging to one mind.)
     It is essential for the nature of communication that it is generated by more than one people.  It is 
made up of the acts of consciousness, which are released from their private, inaccessible mode of 
existence into the public domain. Externalised in a verbal form, conscious acts emanate from different 
subjects, interact and produce new psychological reality, which is a making of the contributing minds, 
of the combination of their verbally externalised thoughts.  This makes it a psychological phenomenon 
without a subject that could perceive the whole process from the first person perspective.  
     The combining of thoughts cannot be controlled by either participant individually because the 
emanations come from different willing subjects. The process of communication is decentred, flows 
from one agent to another and, for the lack of the omniscient mind, evolves spontaneously, irrationally 
and involuntarily, at the same time appearing as an individualised and logically coherent event of a 
psychological kind.    
     Considered in the light of the traditional subject–object schema, the nature of communication is 
ambivalent because communication shows both objective and subjective features but is not quite either 
objective or subjective. On the one hand, facts of communication exist externally from one’s mind and 
are recognised by other minds, and this makes them something objective. On the other hand, they exist 
only for conscious entities – subjects – and evaporate with their absence. This makes communication 
something subjective, something that is a product or a by-product of psychological activity.      
     When I communicate, I externalise my thoughts and they become less personal than when they were 
my inner thoughts. When I articulate them, I forfeit the confidentiality of my inner life, and I no longer 
have the sole possession of my thinking, which I have when I think my thoughts to myself.  As I speak, 
I lose the authority over my thoughts and become subservient to my own words. Beginning to articulate 
my ideas, I commit myself at least to completing the sentence and to maintaining the train of thought 
that I initiated. I am also compelled to respond to the remarks and questions, which my statements 
evoke and in the course of the conversation I may even feel that the dialogue has drifted away from my 
8 See the discussion of living matter as containing features of consciousness. (CE, p. 80) 
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original point and that I am not in command of its further development.  Other participants are not in 
command of the dialogue either. The series of ideas moves forward by means of our unceasing 
contributions, but as there is no single author or editor that could censor it, adjust it and decide on its 
final form, it grows naturally, unedited and unrehearsed, all by itself. The narrative of the conversation 
bounces from one author to another and is constantly altered. 
     Radiating from the subjects, verbalised conscious states gain objective features.  Thoughts that 
become words are accessible for perception and available for rational consideration and external 
scrutiny.  They have an effect on the world and on their own speaker. But communication is not fully 
objective in the sense that it does not exist separately from conscious minds like physical objects do. Its 
mind independent existence amounts to the physical phenomena accompanying speech and writing but 
its existence as communication, an exchange of meanings vanishes if the minds that create it turn away 
from this exchange.  
          One could describe communication as the duration of conscious activity of a number of 
interacting individuals, typically externalised in a verbal form, but also possibly made up of gestures 
and including non-verbal signals.  Externalised facts of consciousness – ideas, opinions, emotional 
responses, requests – and the replies that they receive amalgamate and produce a specific kind of 
intersubjective reality that gains some independence from its individual authors but depends on them 
for its existence.               
Communicating subjects as elements of heterogeneity.
     Instead of being authoritative subjects of communication, able to switch on and off dialogues and 
relationships, people have no sovereignty over these processes that they themselves initiate and 
maintain.  We commit our rationality and our emotions to serving the flow of communication. On a 
minimal scale, if a question is asked, we are compelled to answer it.  We may respond positively or 
negatively, but we naturally feel the urge to react, and refraining from reacting, ignoring a question, an 
accusation or an invitation may be harder than answering it.  
     When one is involved in the flow of communication, it can take over one’s mind and one may be 
bound to continue that flow, to serve it. Engrossed in certain types of communication, one may not be 
able to stop this flow and break the ties that connect him or her with other conductors of that flow, 
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because the flow is itself an internally coherent duration with its own drive to exist and to evolve by 
means of individual minds.  The duration of communication is an enduring process asserting its own 
existence and resisting its own destruction, so the initiators and participants of romantic affairs, family 
circles, social groups instead of manipulating and manoeuvring these communications, let these 
communicative settings manipulate their minds, and become drawn into certain types of 
communication, captivated by them.  
     Involved in the flow of communication, we find it easier to support communication than to produce 
a response that hinders that coherent flow. We may find it easier to continue an unhappy relationship 
than to end it, we may struggle to stop a conflict or end an unpleasant conversation, even though we 
may know that our continuous involvement in this type of communication is damaging to us.  Although 
communication is generated by the externalisation of people’s conscious activity, in relation to all its 
participants it is independent reality that conditions their subsequent moves just as physical 
circumstances do.  Communication acts in relation to its participants as an autonomous entity, which 
summons them to generate behaviour that would continue the given episode of communication. The 
very existence of a concrete communication is dependent on the activity of conscious participants but 
its ultimate content is autonomous from them and subdues those who create it.          
     Purposeful joint human activity generates its own duration that appropriates and absorbs the input of 
individual contributors.  It can exist on a small or large scale and can amount to any social process: a 
conversation, meal, war, family, state.  This conscious super-individual duration is initiated and 
maintained by individual people, but the same people who maintain its existence are dominated by it 
and must obey its principles. This manmade formation reflects on its creators and acts in relation to 
them as an independent, objective formation that dictates the rules and shapes their behaviour.
     In the heterogeneity of communication not only the interacting people are its elements but the 
environment as well. Different circumstances contribute to different relationships because inanimate 
objects and our responses to them are part of the same duration as the people that communicate in these 
circumstances, because one does not communicate with a pure person detached from their 
surroundings. If we change the environment, the location where we meet and the way we dress, the 
nature of communication will change as well. For example, a holiday romance may blossom on a 
seaside, but die out if the lovers meet again in their home town, because their original interest in each 
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other would not have been isolated from the feeling of liberty and bliss felt whilst sunbathing and 
splashing in the sea.
     As elements of heterogeneity, we are not self-sufficient, and our identity is defined via relations 
with other participants of communication, via their actions, via their reactions to our performance.  We 
lend a part of our being to a particular duration of communication, and that part, merged with the entire 
process, is intuited by others as part of the process that they intuit. That part of us is created and 
developed in interactions with other participants and they help create it and intuit it whilst creating it. 
Engaging ourselves in communication, we channel the development of our being, which to some extent 
is developed in communication with the involvement of other people. Unaware of our past and of our 
life beyond the realm of our communication, they nevertheless participate in its creation while we 
communicate and they are able to intuit that part of our being that they themselves help to create.  
Intuition in communication
     Communication is duration in its own right, with its own internal structure, with strong ties between 
its phases, so the people involved in the process of communication are not the full masters of this 
process but are subservient to this process and are driven to sustain and complete communication in 
which they are involved. From this we may conclude that the success of communication does not 
necessarily equal the benefit and satisfaction of the contributors. Neither it equals the complete mutual 
understanding of the contributors. People may feel completely misunderstood and yet communication 
may still successfully evolve and result in some productive outcome which is not necessarily benign in 
relation to the people involved but is ontologically a coherent process.  For example, a sad love story, 
destructive existentially for the people involved, is a complete and ontologically successful event. In a 
sense its participants must be unhappy or the character of this particular communication will be 
different. Also, if in communication we fail to understand each other, this does not necessarily mean 
the failure of communication, because we often communicate in order to achieve something else rather 
than specifically to understand each other’s nature.
     What is the role of intuition in communication? Is intuition an unrealistic solution of our 
epistemological problems whose significance is limited to being an ideal model of awareness, or, 
following Bergson, as a latent ability that can be developed and exercised? It seems that focusing on 
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each other, no matter how intensely, would not give us the desired immersion into another person’s 
soul. Any attempt to understand each other’s nature is destined to failure, and the more intensely we 
focus on each other and obsess with the idea of mutual identification, the more we become frustrated, 
unable to express our inner nature sufficiently for another mind to achieve a complete sympathising 
with what they are. Two human beings facing each other remain individual durations. In fact, their 
facing each other reinforces the impenetrability of their being and secures the privacy of their fleeting 
thoughts and subtle feelings which, unedited and uncensored, can only appear inside one’s own mind.
     We have to agree that only the person himself or herself can intuit their inner being in full, but we 
find that the communicative whole is intuited by its participants who have the intimate and factual 
understanding of that duration from inside. A family member intuits his or her family not in the sense 
that he or she sympathises with and understands the uniqueness of each family member. He or she 
intuits the family as a dynamic system of relations created by its senior members at the point of 
marriage and recreated, reinforced and maintained by certain types of communicative behaviour by 
each member.
     When we exchange messages, we acknowledge more than the factual information. We absorb 
masses of un-articulated information about our shared environment and experiences. If someone 
mentions Buckingham Palace to a person who had visited London, this evokes images of the specific 
atmosphere that surrounds the building, of British weather, of the crowds on the square.  The imagery 
will be rich in content but instantly grasped, so that the conversing people would be intuiting the same 
thing and in this shared intuition they may find mutual understanding. It would be based on shared 
information that people do not articulate but which is assumed and which forms a background to their 
interactions. 
     The sense of mutual understanding can be achieved between the people who have a history of 
belonging to the same duration even if they had not met in person at that time, such as graduates of the 
same university, people of the same ethnic and cultural background, of the same age group and those 
who have similar problems. Under these circumstances people are intuited by one another not because 
they focus on each other and manage to perforate each other’s minds but because they belong 
(partially) to the same duration in their past or present and see one another as participating elements.  
That part of their experiences which is left outside the shared sphere may find no response or 
understanding. For example, two women may sympathise with each other as mothers of young 
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children, but if one of them has been in prison and another one has not, they could not share a sense of 
belonging when talking about that side of life.
     This is a kind of understanding that can only be achieved by sharing experiences because the totality 
of any experience is too complex to translate into words and, say, a video recording would give a one-
sided visual and audio imagery, omitting olfactory and tactile images etc. The duration of shared 
experience or joint action is intuited only by those who create it and contribute to it. 
     In communication people intuit each other’s involvement as heterogeneous elements of duration.  It 
could be said that we intuit each other partially via intuiting the process of which we are part.  In this 
sphere we gain a sense of intuitive belonging without forfeiting the privacy of our inner life, and this 
feeling of belonging can be achieved by simply being in the same environment as other people. 
Passengers on the plane, holidaymakers on the beach, students in the class – even if they do not 
exchange a single word, they know that they are exposed to the same risks and share the same goals as 
others in the group. The mere presence of other people who simply share the same time and place with 
us can be positive emotionally and existentially. One only needs to imagine a deserted beach or an 
empty airport with just one passenger to appreciate the social importance of human presence, 
unaccompanied by intelligent interactions but felt and intuited.  
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